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Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate a repeated “inspection game” where, in the stage game, an 
employee can either work or shirk and an employer simultaneously chooses to inspect or not 
inspect. The unique equilibrium of the stage game is in mixed strategies with positive 
probabilities of shirking/inspecting while combined payoffs are maximized when the employee 
works and the employer does not inspect. We examine the effects of allowing the employer 
discretion to sanction or reward the employee after observing stage game payoffs. When 
employers have limited discretion, and can only apply sanctions and/or rewards following an 
inspection, we find that both instruments are equally effective in reducing shirking and increasing 
joint earnings. When employers have discretion to reward and/or sanction independently of 
whether they inspect we find that rewards are more effective than sanctions. In treatments where 
employers can combine sanctions and rewards employers rely mainly on rewards and outcomes 
closely resemble those of treatments where only rewards are possible. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we compare the effectiveness of positive and negative incentives in an inspection game. This 
game is often used to represent strategic settings characterized by an imperfect alignment of interests 
between players (e.g., interactions between employers and employees, tax authorities and taxpayers, 
regulators and firms, law enforcement agencies and citizens, etc.).1 Note that these settings typically have 
a hierarchical structure: an authority wishes to induce compliance from subordinates. A standard approach 
to encourage compliance is to use explicit contracts that specify automatic and fixed penalties in response 
to observed non-compliance. For example, labor contracts may specify penalties for employees who are 
found to underperform or violate the company’s conduct policy. In addition to automatic incentives, 
authorities may also use discretionary incentives to align subordinates’ interests with their own. For 
example, in the labor context, the nature and severity of the sanctions relating to underperformance may 
vary from verbal and written warnings to dismissal, and employers often have discretion over which 
disciplinary actions (if any) to take against employees. Moreover, in many settings authorities 
complement the use of sanctions for poor performance with the use of automatic and/or discretionary 
rewards. For example, again in the labor context, employers may decide to introduce bonus schemes to 
reward good performance. Such schemes can vary from those where bonuses are part of the employee’s 
contractual entitlement to those where bonuses are awarded on a discretionary basis to motivate 
employees. Rewards can also be given in the form of perks, such as public recognitions of contribution 
(e.g. employee of the month awards), and other non-monetary benefits.  
We conduct an experiment to study the roles of sanctions and rewards. Our experiment builds on 
the standard inspection game discussed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). They discuss a one-shot 
interaction between an employee who chooses whether to work or shirk and an employer who 
simultaneously chooses whether or not to inspect the employee. Working is costly to the employee and 
generates revenue for the employer. Inspections are costly to the employer. The employee receives a wage 
from the employer unless she is inspected and found shirking: in this case the employer automatically 
withholds her wage. This can be interpreted as a contract where the employee is paid a flat wage 
conditional on working. In order to enforce the contract, the employer needs to provide verifiable 
evidence of shirking to the court, and costly inspections are necessary for providing verifiable evidence. 
Joint payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect, but in the 
unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game inspections and shirking occur with 
                                          
1
 See Avenhaus et al. (2002) for a review of the theory and discussion of applications of inspection games. 
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positive probability. Thus, automatic incentives alone are not sufficient to eliminate shirking in 
equilibrium.   
Our focus is on a repeated version of this game, and how the use of discretionary rewards and/or 
sanctions, on top of the automatic sanctions embedded in the inspection game, can discourage shirking. In 
practice, the scope for using discretionary incentives varies considerably across institutional settings, and 
so we vary the scope across various treatments.  
In a Baseline treatment, where discretionary incentives are not available, we find substantial rates 
of inspection and shirking: the proportion of inspections is 70% and employees shirk about 46% of the 
time. In our other treatments we allow employers to sanction or reward employees after observing stage 
game payoffs. Both sanctions and rewards are costly for the employer, while sanctions reduce, and 
rewards increase, the employees’ payoff.  
In one set of treatments we only allow the use of sanctions or rewards after the employer has 
inspected. Thus, although payoffs reveal the employee’s actions, the employer has discretion to reward 
workers or punish shirkers only if an inspection has been carried out to provide complementary evidence 
about the employee’s action. For instance, a manager who wants to punish a slacking employee may be 
compelled to create a track record to justify the intended punishment to a labor union. Similar forms of 
limited discretion are commonplace in performance evaluation schemes in many organizations where 
performance appraisers are themselves agents in a principal-agent relationship with a principal. Even 
though the appraiser knows the appraisee has performed well some costly monitoring process has to be 
used before the appraiser can award a discretionary bonus. For example, this may be the case in firms 
where managers who exercise reward or punishment power over subordinates are themselves accountable 
to superiors for their decisions. 
In these limited discretion treatments we find that the availability of either sanctions or rewards 
reduces the proportion of shirking relative to the baseline treatment (to 29% in both cases). In the 
treatment with sanctions this is achieved with a lower inspection rate than in the treatment with rewards. 
An implication of this is that sanctions or rewards increase combined earnings by roughly the same 
amount, but the efficiency gains accrue solely to the employer when sanctions are available, whereas the 
efficiency gains are shared in the case of discretionary rewards. We think this is a direct consequence of 
the nature of the incentive tools; rewards allow the employer to redistribute part of the efficiency gains 
while this is not possible with sanctions.  
One feature of the limited discretion treatments is that if the employer wants to reward the worker 
for working she needs to inspect and incur the associated inspection costs. This makes a strategy of 
encouraging work by rewarding workers less efficient, and so our limited discretion treatment may 
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underestimate the efficacy of rewards. In another set of treatments we allow the employer to administer 
discretionary rewards or punishments independently of whether the employer inspected. This set of 
treatments is relevant for situations where employers do not have to justify their behavior to a principal, as 
may be the case in owner-managed firms where managers do not have to explain their use of discretionary 
rewards or punishments to a superior.2 
We find that extending the employer’s discretion in this manner does not alter the effectiveness of 
punishment, but increases the effectiveness of discretionary rewards. When employers are free to use 
discretionary rewards without the need for inspections, the rate of shirking drops to 15%. As a result, 
rewards are more effective than punishment in the high discretion treatments. As in the limited discretion 
treatments, the efficiency gains of punishments only benefit the employer, whereas with rewards the 
greater increase in combined earnings is shared much more equally.  
In order to compare the effectiveness of discretionary rewards and sanctions our experiment 
varies the availability of the instruments across treatments, and employers have available at most one of 
the instruments. In natural workplaces both instruments are often available to employers. Thus, we 
conducted additional treatments where employers can combine discretionary sanctions and rewards. In 
these treatments we find that employers rely mainly on rewards and the results from these treatments are 
very similar to the treatments where only rewards are available.  
In summary, our findings suggest that both positive and negative discretionary incentives can be 
effective in disciplining the behavior of subordinates and increasing efficiency. However, the two 
instruments work quite differently and their relative merits depend on how freely they can be administered. 
From an efficiency perspective, sanctions involve an obvious disadvantage relative to rewards, in that 
punishment is costly to both the punisher and punishee. If the threat of sanctions eliminates shirking then 
punishment is not necessary and these deadweight costs can be avoided, but if the threat works 
imperfectly the loss of efficiency is compounded by the costs of having to use the instrument. In contrast, 
if rewards successfully motivate subordinates then they must be actively used. In our setting rewards 
increase combined earnings, although if employers need to engage in costly inspections in order to 
administer rewards then these costs undermine the efficacy of rewards.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the 
inspection games used in our experiment and in Section 3 describe our design and experimental 
procedures. We present our experimental results in Sections 4 and 5. In Section 6 we discuss how our 
findings relate to the literature in more detail, and we conclude.  
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 We thank an Associate Editor for suggesting these additional treatments. 
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2. THE INSPECTION GAME 
The inspection game involves two players and simultaneous moves. The employer chooses between 
“Inspect” and “Not Inspect”, and the employee chooses between “Work” and “Shirk”. In the standard 
version of the game, the employer incurs a cost of h from inspecting. If the employee works, the employee 
incurs a cost of c and the employer receives revenue of v. If the employer does not inspect, the employee 
always receives a wage of w. If the employer inspects, the employee receives the wage only if she works. 
The resulting payoffs are shown Figure 1(A). We assume that all variables are positive and v >  c, w >  h, 
w >  c. Note that joint payoffs are maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. 
In the unique Nash equilibrium the employer inspects with probability p =  c/w and the employee shirks 
with probability q =  h/w. The employer receives an expected payoff of employer =  v – w – hv/w, the 
employee receives an expected payoff of  employee =  w – c, and joint payoffs are  employer +  employee =  v – c 
– hv/w.   
Figure 1: Inspection game 
  (A) STANDARD INSPECTION GAME  (B) EXPERIMENTAL INSPECTION GAME 
 Work Shirk   Work Shirk 
Inspect 
v – w – h 
 
        w – c 
– h 
 
             0 
 
Inspect 
30 
 
                20  
10 
 
              15 
Not inspect 
v – w 
 
        w – c 
– w 
 
             w 
 
Not inspect 
45 
 
                20 
5 
 
              35 
 
Notes: Employer is ROW player, Employee is COLUMN player. Within each cell, the Employer’s 
payoff is shown at the top and the Employee’s payoff at the bottom.  
For the experiment we set v = 40, w = 20, c = 15, and h = 15 and added a constant of 15 to the 
employee’s payoff and 25 to the employer’s payoff to ensure that all earnings are positive. Figure 1(B) 
presents the resulting payoffs that we used in the experiment. With these parameters the employer’s 
equilibrium inspection probability is p = ¾ and the employee’s equilibrium shirking probability is q= ¾, 
giving expected payoffs of 15 for the employer and 20 for the employee. This inspection game is the stage 
game in our baseline treatment. 
In our treatments with low discretionary power, if the employer has chosen “Not Inspect” the 
stage game ends. However, if the employer chose “Inspect” the stage game continues. In the games where 
we allow for punishments the employer observes the employee’s choice and then chooses between “No 
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Action” and “Punish”. If he chooses “No Action”, then the payoffs are simply determined by the payoffs 
of the inspection game. If he chooses “Punish” he must assign a punishment level k from the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5} and the employer’s payoff from the inspection game is then decreased by k while the employee’s 
payoff is decreased by 3k. Thus, these discretionary punishments are costly for both parties and have a 
negative direct impact on combined earnings.3 Figure 2(A) presents this augmented game graphically. 
Similarly, in the games where we allow for rewards the employer can choose between “No 
Action” and “Reward” after an inspection. If he chooses “Reward” he then chooses the reward level l 
from the set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the employer’s payoff from the inspection game is then decreased by l 
while the employee’s payoff is increased by 3l.4 Note that the use of rewards can increase combined 
earnings; a maximal reward costs the employer 5 points and benefits the employee 15 points, giving a net 
benefit of 10 points. Note, however, that rewards can only be given following an inspection, and the 
inspection cost (15 points) exceeds the net benefit from maximal rewards. Thus, combined earnings are 
still maximized when the employee works and the employer does not inspect. The augmented game with 
reward possibilities is shown in Figure 2(B). 
In our high discretion treatments the employer can assign punishments or rewards independently 
of whether he inspects. The extensive forms of the stage game are shown in Figures 2(C) and 2(D). 
Figure 2: Augmented inspection games 
(A) LOW DISCRETION GAME WITH PUNISHMENTS  (B) LOW DISCRETION GAME WITH REWARDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employer 
employer 
employee 
 
30, 20 
 
30-k, 20-3k 
 
10, 15 
 
10-k, 15-3k 
 
45, 20 
 
5, 35 
 
NO 
ACTION PUNISH k 
NO 
ACTION PUNISH k 
 
WORK SHIRK WORK SHIRK 
NOT INSPECT INSPECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employer 
employer 
employee 
 
30, 20 
 
30-l, 20+3l 
 
10, 15 
 
10-l, 15+3l 
 
(45, 20) 
 
(5, 35) 
 
NO 
ACTION REWARD l 
NO 
ACTION REWARD l 
WORK SHIRK WORK SHIRK 
NOT INSPECT INSPECT 
 
                                          
3
 Except, of course, in the case where the employer assigns zero punishment. We decided to include this in the set of 
available punishments as it may be useful for signaling purposes in settings where the game is played repeatedly, e.g. 
an employer might assign zero punishment tokens as a warning. 
4
 We also conducted low discretion sessions where the impact/fee ratio (i.e. the cost/benefit of the instrument to the 
employee relative to the cost of instrument to employer) was one to one. These treatments did not result in 
significant differences from Baseline in terms of either shirk rate, inspection rate, employer payoff or employee 
payoff. See Nosenzo et al. (2012) for details. Several public good experiments also find that costly 
punishment/reward is more effective with a higher impact/fee ratio (e.g. Ambrus and Greiner, 2012; Egas and Riedl, 
2008; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). 
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(C) HIGH DISCRETION GAME WITH PUNISHMENTS  (D) HIGH DISCRETION GAME WITH REWARDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employer 
employer 
employee 
 
30, 20 
 
30-k, 20-3k 
 
10, 15 
 
10-k, 15-3k 
 
45, 20 
 
45-k, 20-3k 5, 35 
 
5-k, 35-3k 
 
NO 
ACTION PUNISH k 
NO 
ACTION PUNISH k 
 
NO 
ACTION PUNISH k 
 
NO 
ACTION PUNISH k 
 
WORK SHIRK WORK SHIRK 
NOT INSPECT INSPECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
employer 
employer 
employee 
 
30, 20 
 
30-l, 20+3l 
 
10, 15 
 
10-l, 15+3l 
 
45, 20 
 
45-l, 20+3l 
 
5, 35 
 
5-l, 35+3l 
 
NO 
ACTION REWARD l 
NO 
ACTION REWARD l 
NO 
ACTION REWARD l 
NO 
ACTION REWARD l 
WORK SHIRK WORK SHIRK 
NOT INSPECT INSPECT 
 
Notes: The first payoff accrues to the Employer and the second payoff to Employee. When choosing k (or l), the 
employer is informed of whether the worker worked or shirked, and therefore can choose a different k (or l) after 
work than after shirk.  
Subgame perfect equilibria of the augmented games can be identified by backward induction. A 
selfish and rational employer will never assign positive rewards or punishments since it lowers her own 
payoff. This behavior is anticipated by the players, and, as a result, play in the phase preceding the 
punishment/reward phase remains unaffected. Thus, in the subgame perfect equilibrium players mix 
between their actions in precisely the same way as in the baseline treatment, i.e., p = ¾ and q = ¾, and 
discretionary rewards or punishments are never used. 
In naturally occurring workplace settings, and in our experiment, employers and employees are 
usually engaged in a repeated interaction. Here, we consider the case where in each stage the game 
described above is played and where a player’s earnings are simply the sum of his earnings over all stage 
games. After each stage game, there will be a new stage game with independent probability δ and this 
process continues until it is terminated by chance. As is well known, repetition of the stage game 
equilibrium constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated game, but other 
outcomes can be sustained as equilibria as well.  
First, consider the Baseline game where punishment and rewards are not possible. Repetition of 
the joint payoff maximizing outcome cannot be sustained in equilibrium. To see this note that for any pair 
of strategies yielding the outcome “Not Inspect, Work” in every stage, and hence a payoff of 20 for the 
employee in every stage, the employee can deviate to a strategy that specifies shirking in the first stage 
and working in all subsequent stages. This deviation is profitable since it yields 35 in the first stage and 20 
in all subsequent stages.  
However, even if the joint-payoff maximizing outcome cannot be fully achieved it can be 
approximated rather closely by subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. Consider the following strategies: 
On the equilibrium path the employer does not inspect and the worker shirks every nth stage. If the worker 
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shirks in any other stage, or if the employer ever inspects, both players revert to the one-shot Nash 
equilibrium in all stages thereafter. These strategies generate a cycle of outcomes where “Not Inspect, 
Work” occurs except for every nth stage when “Not Inspect, Shirk” occurs. The expected sum of payoffs 
from the beginning of the cycle is Vemployercycle = 45/(1 – δ) – δn–140/(1 – δn) for the employer and 
Vemployeecycle = 20/(1 – δ) + δn–115/(1 – δn) for the employee. Letting VemployerNash = 15/(1 – δ) and 
VemployeeNash = 20/(1 – δ) be the expected sums of payoffs from one-shot Nash equilibrium play, the cycle 
strategies form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if  
Vemployeecycle ≥ 35 + δ VemployeeNash, 
and     5 + δ Vemployercycle ≥ 10 + δ VemployerNash 
The first inequality ensures that the employee has no incentive to deviate at the beginning of the cycle (as 
he approaches the end of the cycle any incentive to deviate only diminishes). The second ensures that the 
employer has no incentive to deviate at the end of the cycle. As δ increases these constraints can be met 
with larger n, and the relative frequency of attaining the efficient stage game outcome approaches one. 
Similarly, when employers can only reward following an inspection, the indefinitely repeated 
game does not have a fully efficient subgame perfect equilibrium, but there are analogous subgame 
perfect equilibrium strategies that cycle between “Not Inspect, Work” and “Inspect Work” and improve 
on the one-shot equilibrium for both players.  As δ increases the relative frequency of attaining the 
efficient stage game outcome approaches one. 
For our other treatments the efficient outcome can be supported by subgame perfect equilibrium 
strategies. When employers can reward independently of whether they inspect the efficient outcome is 
“Not Inspect, Work” followed by maximal rewards, giving the employer a stage payoff of 40 and the 
employee a stage payoff of 35. This outcome can be supported by simple Nash reversion strategies. The 
employee never has an incentive to deviate from working, the employer never has an incentive to inspect, 
and as long as 40/(1 – δ) ≥ 45 + δ15/(1 – δ), or, equivalently, δ ≥ 1/6, the employer has no incentive to 
withhold the reward. When employers can punish (either following an inspection, or independently of 
whether they inspect) it is possible to attain repetition of the efficient outcome “Not Inspect, Work” in a 
subgame perfect equilibrium because punishment allows the employer to reduce the employee’s stage 
payoff below 20, and this can then serve as a threat that induces the employee to work. If the employee 
shirks in a stage, a disciplinary phase will start in which the employer persistently chooses to inspect and 
to assign punishment points. In this phase, the employee’s stage game payoff is reduced below 20 and if 
the discount factor is sufficiently high, the employee will prefer to work if she faces this threat.5 On the 
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 For details see Nosenzo et al. (2012). 
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equilibrium path the outcome “Not Inspect, Work” is observed in every stage, punishment is not actually 
used, and all of the efficiency gains relative to the one-shot equilibrium accrue to the employer.   
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
The computerized experiments were carried out at the University of Nottingham with 178 subjects 
recruited from a campus-wide distribution list.6 No subject participated in more than one session. Three 
sessions were conducted for each of five treatments, with either five or six pairs of participants in a 
session. Sessions consisted of a number of rounds and at the end of a session subjects were paid in cash 
according to their accumulated point earnings from all rounds. Sessions took about 40 minutes on average 
and earnings ranged between £5.65 and £23.20, averaging £13.21. 
At the beginning of a session subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals and given 
paper copies of instructions, which an experimenter then read out loud. The instructions concluded with a 
series of questions testing subjects’ understanding of the instructions. Answers were checked by the 
experimenters, who dealt privately with any remaining questions. During a session no communication 
between subjects was allowed. 
After the instructional phase subjects were assigned to pairs and roles. Within each pair, one 
subject received the role of Employer and the other the role of Employee.7 Subjects knew that they would 
stay in the same role and in the same pair during the whole experiment. They were informed that the 
session consisted of at least 70 rounds. From round 70 onwards, each round could be the last one with 
probability 1/5.8  
In each treatment, at the beginning of a round the Employee chose between “high effort” (work) 
and “low effort” (shirk) and, at the same time, the Employer chose between “inspect” and “not inspect”. 
Choices led to point earnings as presented in the right panel of Figure 1. In the Baseline treatment these 
were the only choices made in the round, and subjects were immediately informed about the choices and 
point earnings within their pair. 
The other treatments varied from the Baseline treatment in the instruments available to employers 
for incentivizing employees (punishments or rewards), and the level of discretion available to employers 
in using the incentives (low or high). In these treatments, after being informed of whether the Employee 
                                          
6
 Subjects were recruited through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The instructions to subjects 
that were used in the experiment are reproduced in Appendix A.  
7
 The actual labels used in the experiment were “Employer” and “Worker”.  
8
 In fact the last round was randomly determined according to these rules prior to the Baseline sessions and this 
resulted in three sessions with 71, 73 and 83 rounds, respectively. We then used these durations for the other 
treatments as well.  
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chose work or shirk, the Employer had to make an additional choice. In the low discretion treatments, this 
additional choice was available to the Employer only if he had first committed to an inspection. In the 
high discretion treatments, the additional choice was available to the Employer regardless of his choice 
whether or not to inspect. In the PLow_Discretion and PHigh_Discretion treatments the Employer chose between 
“No Action” and “Punish”, and if “Punish” was chosen the Employer then chose the number of 
punishment tokens, between 0 and 5, to assign to the Employee. Each token cost the Employer one point 
and reduced the Employee’s earnings by three points. In the RLow_Discretion and RHigh_Discretion treatments the 
Employer chose between “No Action” and “Reward”, and if “Reward” was chosen he then had to choose 
the number of reward tokens, between 0 and 5, to assign to the Employee. Each token cost the Employer 
one point and increased the Employee’s earnings by three points. Finally, both players were informed of 
all choices and earnings in the pair (so the employee was also informed in case the employer assigned 0 
reward/punishment tokens). Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. 
Table 1: Experimental design 
Treatment Punishments Rewards Level of Discretion Number of pairs 
Baseline No No --- 17 
PLow_Discretion Yes No Low 18 
PHigh_Discretion Yes No High 18 
RLow_Discretion No Yes Low 18 
RHigh_Discretion No Yes High 18 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 The Impact of Incentives on Inspecting and Shirking 
Figure 3 displays the proportion of inspecting (top panels) and shirking (bottom panels) across rounds 
disaggregated by treatment. Table 2 reports average rates of inspecting and shirking across the first 70 
rounds of the experiment as well as significance levels of treatment comparisons based on two-tailed 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.9  
                                          
9
 In all tests we consider data from each pair as one independent observation and so the tests are applied to 18 
independent observations per treatment (17 in Baseline). Tests are applied to averages based on the first 70 rounds of 
the experiment, where we have data from all 89 pairs who took part in the experiment. Analysis using all data is 
complicated by the fact that some pairs interacted for more rounds than others and we have very small sample sizes 
in the later rounds. However, all our main results also hold in the full sample. To check whether there is any 
evidence of learning in our data, we repeated the analysis using only observations from the second half of the 
experiment. All our main results are unchanged; details are available from the authors on request. 
11 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of inspections (top panel) and shirking (bottom panel) across rounds 
 
Notes: the Figure is based on data from 18 games per treatment (17 in Baseline).  
Table 2: Average inspection and shirking rates 
 Baseline 
(n = 17) 
PLow_Discretion 
(n = 18) 
RLow_Discretion 
(n = 18)  
PHigh_Discretion 
(n = 18)  
RHigh_Discretion 
(n = 18)  
Inspect 70% 56% 76% 55% 32% 
Shirk 46% 29% 29% 29% 15% 
 Baseline PLow_Discretion RLow_Discretion PHigh_Discretion RHigh_Discretion 
Baseline - - - - - 
PLow_Discretion n.s. / ** - - - - 
RLow_Discretion n.s. / ** ** / n.s. - - - 
PHigh_Discretion n.s. / ** n.s. / n.s. - - - 
RHigh_Discretion *** / *** - *** / ** ** / *** - 
Notes: The first two rows of the table contain the average rates of inspecting and shirking 
across the first 70 rounds of the experiment. The remaining rows of the table contain 
significance levels of pairwise two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. In each cell the first entry 
refers to tests applied to inspection rates, while the second entry refers to tests applied to 
shirking rates. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; n.s. p ≥ 0.10. 
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First, consider the low discretion treatments. The rate of inspection is similar in Baseline and 
RLow_Discretion. As shown in Figure 3 (top-left panel) in both treatments inspections increase across rounds 
and stabilize at the Nash stage game equilibrium level (75%) in the last third of the experiment. The rate 
of inspection is somewhat lower in the PLow_Discretion treatment, although only the difference between 
PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion is statistically significant at the 5% level (see Table 2). 
The rate of shirking in the low discretion treatments is shown in the bottom-left panel of Figure 3. 
In all treatments this is quite stable across rounds and much lower than the Nash stage game equilibrium 
level (75%). There is noticeably less shirking in PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion than in Baseline, and these 
differences are statistically significant. It is worth noting that the rate of shirking is not significantly different 
in PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion, and so the lower inspection frequency in the punishment treatment relative 
to the reward treatment is not associated with higher shirking. Thus, under low discretion both incentive 
tools are equally effective in reducing shirking, but inspection rates are lower when punishment is available. 
The right panels of Figure 3 contain data from the Baseline and high discretion treatments. 
Similarly to the low discretion case, the rate of inspection in PHigh_Discretion is somewhat lower than in 
Baseline, but the difference is not statistically significant. The inspection rate in the RHigh_Discretion treatment 
is significantly lower than in Baseline and PHigh_Discretion. Thus, and in contrast to the low discretion case, 
inspections are used much less frequently when rewards can be administered independently of the 
commitment to an inspection. In fact, the difference in inspection rates between the R treatments with low 
and high discretion is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the contrary, in the case of punishment, 
the higher discretion in the use of the instrument does not significantly affect the frequency with which 
employers commit to inspections.  
The lower inspection rate in the RHigh_Discretion treatment is not associated with a higher rate of 
shirking. In fact, the level of shirking in RHigh_Discretion is noticeably lower than in Baseline and PHigh_Discretion, 
and these differences are highly significant. The rate of shirking is also significantly lower in PHigh_Discretion 
than Baseline. Thus, the higher discretion available to employers in the use of rewards increases the 
effectiveness of the instrument: the rate of shirking in the RHigh_Discretion treatment is significantly lower than 
in RLow_Discretion. In contrast, the effectiveness of punishment in deterring shirking is not affected by level of 
discretion available to the employer. 
In summary, although theoretically the efficient outcome can be approximated even in the 
standard inspection game, our experiments reveal considerable efficiency losses in the absence of 
discretionary incentives. The availability of discretionary punishment and rewards considerably improves 
efficiency, although the relative effectiveness of the instruments depends on the level of discretion 
available to employers. When employers can only administer incentives after an inspection (low 
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discretion case), punishments and rewards are equally effective in discouraging shirking relative to the 
standard inspection game. However, the punishment tool has the advantage that the reduction in shirking 
is achieved with less costly inspections than when rewards are available. Thus, the effectiveness of 
punishment seems to mainly operate through the threat rather than the use of sanctions. In contrast, the 
effectiveness of rewards relies on the active use of the instruments, which, in the low discretion treatments, 
involves inefficient inspections on the part of the employer. In the high discretion treatments, however, 
employers can use the instruments independently of whether they inspect. While this does not change the 
effectiveness of punishment relative to the low discretion case, it has a dramatic impact in the reward 
treatment. Here we observe substantially less shirking and inspecting than in the low discretion case. Thus, 
rewards can be more effective than sanctions, if employers do not have to engage in costly inspections to 
use the incentives. 
4.2 The Use and Effectiveness of Punishments and Rewards 
We next focus on the treatments with discretionary punishments or rewards, and examine how employers 
used the incentives and how employees reacted to this. In the experiment, after learning the choice of the 
employee, employers decided whether to take no action or to assign punishment or reward tokens, 
depending on the treatment (in the low discretion treatments, these choices were available only after an 
inspection). Figure 4 shows the proportion of “No Action” decisions and punishment/rewards tokens 
assignments disaggregated by treatment. In the experiment punishments are mainly targeted at shirkers 
and rewards are mainly given to employees observed to have worked in that round. Thus, we observe very 
little use of punishment against employees who worked – this occurs in 36 out of 1382 games - and very 
little use of rewards for shirkers – in 48 out of 480 games. Therefore, in Figure 4 we report punishment 
decisions for the cases where the employee was observed to shirk for the PLow_Discretion and PHigh_Discretion 
treatments, whereas we report reward decisions for the cases where the employee was observed to work 
for the RLow_Discretion and RHigh_Discretion treatments. In the high discretion treatments (right panels), we 
disaggregate the data depending on whether or not the punishment/rewards tokens were assigned after an 
inspection. In the low discretion treatments (left panels), tokens assignments were only possible after an 
inspection.  
In the PLow_Discretion (top-left) and PHigh_Discretion (top-right) treatments punishment happens more 
often than not when an employee is caught shirking after an inspection (62% of the games in PLow_Discretion 
and 71% in PHigh_Discretion). However, when the employer does not inspect in PHigh_Discretion, shirkers are only 
punished 37% of the times. When employers decide to punish, in both treatments by far the most common 
use of the incentive tool is to assign maximal punishment to the employee (5 tokens). Overall, the 
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expected number of punishment tokens assigned to an employee who shirks is equal to 2.10 in 
PLow_Discretion, 3.10 in PHigh_Discretion when the employer inspects, and 1.70 in PHigh_Discretion when the employer 
does not inspect.  
Figure 4: Use of punishments for shirk and rewards for work 
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Notes: based on 223 games in PLow_Discretion, 365 games in PHigh_Discretion, 660 games in RLow_Discretion, and 
1074 games in RHigh_Discretion. 
In the RLow_Discretion treatment (bottom-left) employers reward employees found working in 71% of 
the games, and in the RHigh_Discretion treatment (bottom-right) in 67% of the games where the employer 
inspects and 95% of the games where the employer does not inspect. Rewards are used differently under 
low and high discretion. In RLow_Discretion, following an inspection, employers tend to use either maximal 
rewards (21% of the time), or to assign 2 or 3 reward tokens (respectively 17% and 20% of the time). In 
RHigh_Discretion, maximal rewards are used only 4% of the times after an inspection, and the most frequent 
assignments are 1 or 2 reward tokens (respectively 27% and 32% of the time). Moreover, the pattern of 
rewards is different when employers do not inspect: here rewards are mostly used to reward employees 
maximally (this occurs in 72% of the games). As a consequence, the expected number of reward tokens 
assigned to an employee who works varies from 2.18 in RLow_Discretion, to 1.26 in RHigh_Discretion when the 
employer inspects, to 4.33 RHigh_Discretion when the employer does not inspect. This change in the way 
rewards are used may reflect employers’ concerns with relative earnings. For example, differences in 
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earnings between the players are minimized by assigning 2 or 3 reward tokens following “Inspect, Work” 
and by assigning 5 reward tokens following “Not Inspect, Work”. 
Table 3 reports OLS regressions of the use of the punishment/reward instruments across the four 
treatments. In all regression models, the dependent variable is the number of punishment or rewards 
tokens assigned to an employee.10 We regress this on a constant and on a dummy variable assuming value 
1 if the employee is observed to shirk in that round. For the high discretion treatments, we also include a 
dummy variable assuming value 1 if the employer inspects in that round. We also control for period and 
learning effects by including a “Round” variable in all models. To account for the panel structure of the 
data, we add individual-level fixed effects to all regression models. 
Table 3: Use of punishments and rewards 
 PLow_Discretion  PHigh_Discretion  RLow_Discretion  RHigh_Discretion  
1 if Shirk 1.294
***
 
(0.343) 
2.423*** 
(0.438) 
-.906*** 
(0.220) 
-1.629*** 
(0.423) 
1 if Inspect - .088 (0.239) - 
-.841*** 
(0.223) 
Round -.004
**
 
(0.002) 
-.005 
(0.003) 
.001 
(0.003) 
.002 
(0.004) 
Constant .193 (0.124) 
.101 
(0.221) 
1.453*** 
(0.121) 
3.409*** 
(0.130) 
N. of observations 
N. of groups 
R2 
1260 
18 
.169 
1260 
18 
.403 
1260 
18 
.141 
1260 
18 
.573 
Notes: Fixed-effects OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent 
variable is number of punishment/rewards tokens assigned. When the employer 
chooses “No Action” the dependent variable takes value 0. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.   
The regressions confirm that punishments are mainly used to sanction shirkers and rewards are 
mainly given to employees who are observed to work. Both under low and high discretion employers 
assign significantly more punishment tokens and significantly fewer reward tokens to employees who 
have shirked in that round. The regressions also show some differences in the use of punishment and 
rewards across rounds. Employees are punished less in later rounds of the experiment, although the effect 
is only significant in the low discretion treatment. The use of rewards is instead more stable over time. 
Finally, the regressions confirm that in the high discretion treatments the use of the instruments varies 
depending on whether or not employers commit to an inspection. Employees are punished somewhat 
                                          
10
 In the regressions the dependent variable assumes value 0 also when the employer chooses “No Action”.  
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more strongly after an inspection, although the difference is not statistically significant, whereas they 
receive significantly less rewards when the employer inspects. 
We next examine the effectiveness of the punishment and reward instruments by studying 
employees’ probability of shirking in the round following the assignment of a punishment or reward. 
Table 4 shows, across treatments, the proportion of employees who shirk in round t following a “No 
Action”, “Punish” or “Reward” decision by the employer in round t-1. As before, for the PLow_Discretion and 
PHigh_Discretion treatments we restrict attention to cases where the employee was observed to shirk in round t-
1, and for the RLow_Discretion and RHigh_Discretion treatments to cases where the employee was observed to work. 
For the high discretion treatments, we further disaggregate the data depending on whether the employer 
made an inspection in round t-1. 
Table 4 suggests that the use of punishments has limited effectiveness in discouraging shirking. If 
the employer takes no action or assigns 0 punishment tokens to an employee who is observed to shirk in 
round t-1, the probability that the employee will shirk again in round t is between 38% and 50% 
depending on treatment. This probability of shirking is hardly reduced by the use of punishments: if the 
employer assigns maximal punishment (5 tokens) to a shirker, the probability that the employee will shirk 
again in round t varies between 29% and 52% across treatments. In fact, in some cases, the use of 
punishment seems to increase the probability of shirking (e.g., in PLow_Discretion and in PHigh_Discretion after an 
inspection). The use of rewards has instead a stronger dissuasive effect on shirking. Withholding a reward 
from an employee who is observed to work in round t-1, increases the probability that the employee will 
shirk in round t to between 27% and 35% depending on treatment. However, the probability of shirking 
falls between 0% and 15% when the employer rewards maximally an employee who is observed to work. 
The dissuasive effect of rewards appears particularly strong in RHigh_Discretion, where the probability of 
shirking is virtually reduced to zero with the use of maximal rewards. 
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Table 4: Probability of shirking in round t after punishments/rewards in round t-1 
  Punishment/Reward in round t-1 
Treatment Employer/Employee 
actions in round t-1 
No Action or 
0 tokens 1 or 2 tokens 3 or 4 tokens 5 tokens 
PLow_Discretion  Inspect, Shirk 50% (n = 102) 
50% 
(n = 28) 
62% 
(n = 21) 
48% 
(n = 69) 
PHigh_Discretion  
Inspect, Shirk 49% (n = 47) 
25% 
(n = 12) 
44% 
(n = 16) 
52% 
(n = 84) 
Not Inspect, Shirk 38% (n = 123) 
33% 
(n = 6) 
25% 
(n = 8) 
29% 
(n = 62) 
RLow_Discretion  Inspect, Work 27% (n = 192) 
18% 
(n = 179) 
7% 
(n = 146) 
15% 
(n = 136) 
RHigh_Discretion  
Inspect, Work 35% (n = 93) 
14% 
(n = 170) 
0% 
(n = 12) 
0% 
(n = 13) 
Not Inspect, Work 32% (n = 40) 
17% 
(n = 53) 
15% 
(n = 120) 
2% 
(n = 559) 
Notes: Proportion of employees who shirk in round t in response to a given punishment/reward 
assignment in round t-1. Number of games reported in parentheses.  
In Table 5 we examine these patterns more formally by conducting a regression analysis of 
employees’ responses in round t to punishments/rewards assigned by the employer in round t-1. We run a 
separate regression model for each of our four treatments. In all models the dependent variable assumes 
value 1 if the employee shirks in round t, and 0 otherwise. We regress this on a set of dummy variables for 
the possible game outcomes in round t-1 (“Inspect, Shirk”; “Inspect, Work”; “Not Inspect, Shirk” – note 
that the efficient outcome “Not Inspect, Work” is used as baseline category). We measure the impact of 
punishment and reward on shirking across the four possible outcomes of the game by interacting the 
outcome variables with the number of punishment/reward tokens assigned to the employee in round t-1.11 
All models also include a constant and a “Round” variable to control for period and learning effects. We 
estimate linear probability models with individual-level fixed effects to account for the panel structure of 
the data. 
                                          
11
 When the employer chooses “No Action” we assign value 0 to these variables. In the low discretion models only 
interactions with game outcomes where the employer inspects are included in the regressions. 
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Table 5: Effectiveness of punishments and rewards 
 PLow_Discretion  PHigh_Discretion  RLow_Discretion  RHigh_Discretion  
“Insp, Shirk” in t-1 -.078 (0.056) 
.126 
(0.131) 
.084 
(0.071) 
.060 
(0.106) 
“Insp, Work” in t-1 -.219*** (0.051) 
-.097 
(0.061) 
-.210*** 
(0.055) 
-.029 
(0.083) 
“Not Insp, Shirk” in t-1 -.152** (0.067) 
-.082 
(0.093) 
-.026 
(0.066) 
-.067 
(0.125) 
Tokens × “Insp, Shirk” in t-1 .038* (0.020) 
.008 
(0.019) 
-.007 
(0.043) 
-.211*** 
(0.050) 
Tokens × “Insp, Work” in t-1 .032** (0.012) 
.053** 
(0.022) 
.021 
(0.014) 
-.064** 
(0.029) 
Tokens × “Not Insp, Shirk” in t-1 - .002 (0.016) - 
-.041 
(0.033) 
Tokens × “Not Insp, Work” in t-1 - .106*** (0.013) - 
-.031** 
(0.015) 
Round -.001 (0.001) 
-.000 
(0.001) 
-.001 
(0.001) 
-.001 
(0.001) 
Constant .438
***
 
(0.053) 
.339*** 
(0.076) 
.408*** 
(0.044) 
.292*** 
(0.072) 
N. of observations 
N. of groups 
R2 
1242 
18 
.024 
1242 
18 
.049 
1242 
18 
.079 
1242 
18 
.157 
Notes: Fixed-effects OLS regressions with robust standard errors. Dependent variable assumes value 1 
if the employee shirks in round t, and 0 otherwise. When the employer chooses “No Action” the 
“Tokens” variables take value 0. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 
0.05; * p < 0.10.  
The regressions for the punishment treatments confirm the limited effectiveness of sanctions in 
discouraging shirking. In neither punishment treatment does punishing a shirker reduce the employee’s 
propensity to shirk in the next round, and, in fact, in PLow_Discretion there is a marginally significant positive 
effect. Moreover, in both punishment treatments punishing an employee who works significantly 
increases the probability that the employee shirks in the next round. This seems a reasonable response to a 
perverse use of the punishment instrument, although these cases are quite rare in the data.12 Rewards are 
instead more effective in discouraging shirking. This is particularly evident in the RHigh_Discretion treatment, 
where all four interaction terms between game outcomes and number of assigned tokens enter the 
regression with a negative sign, and in three cases the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 
                                          
12
 This perverse effect of punishment echoes the findings on the reduced effectiveness of sanctions when these are 
perceived as unkind or hostile by the recipient of the punishment (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2002; 
Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Houser et al., 2008; Fuster and 
Meier, 2010; Nikiforakis et al., 2012). 
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the 1% or 5% level. The effect is less clear in the RLow_Discretion treatment, where the two interaction terms 
between reward tokens and game outcomes enter with a positive and negative coefficient, respectively. In 
both cases, however, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero.13 
In summary, our analysis shows that employers mainly target punishments at shirkers and rewards 
at employees who are observed to work. The instruments, however, appear to have a different impact on 
employees' behavior. The use of punishment seems to have a limited effect on shirking: the probability 
that employees shirk in a given round of the experiment is hardly affected by whether or not the employer 
has meted out punishments towards them in the previous round. On the other hand, the use of rewards 
seems to reduce shirking. Employees who work and receive a reward are very likely to continue working 
in subsequent periods, while they are more likely to shirk if the employer withholds the reward from them. 
These patterns are consistent with our earlier observation that the effectiveness of sanctions mainly relies 
on the threat of punishment rather than the active use of the instrument, while the effectiveness of rewards 
stems from their active use.  
4.3 Efficiency and Earnings 
We conclude our analysis by examining the impact of punishments and rewards on players' earnings and 
efficiency. We focus on total earnings, i.e. the earnings that players received at the end of each round, 
including any cost or benefit following the use of rewards and punishments. Since the maximum possible 
earnings in RHigh_Discretion are higher than in the other treatments, as a measure of efficiency we take the 
percentage of maximum possible earnings extracted by the players. Table 6 reports players’ individual 
earnings, combined earnings, and efficiencies per game across treatments. 
In Baseline combined earnings can range from 25 points (when the employer inspects and the 
employee shirks) to 65 points (when the employer does not inspect and the employee works). In the Nash 
stage game equilibrium, predicted combined earnings are 35 points (i.e. an efficiency of 54%). In the 
experiment, efficiency is 12% higher than this, and combined earnings average 42.91 points across rounds. 
Averaged over all pairs, the main recipient of this efficiency gain is the employer, who earns much more 
than predicted (22.82 vs. 15 points), whereas employees’ earnings are close to the predicted level (20.09 
vs. 20 points).  
In the low discretion treatments the availability of punishment and rewards has a positive and 
significant impact on efficiency and earnings. Relative to Baseline, combined earnings are significantly 
                                          
13
 We also conducted analogous regressions to examine the determinants of employers’ propensity to inspect. The 
regressions show no clear relation between use of punishments and the propensity to inspect, but do show that the 
use of rewards in a given round reduces the probability that the employer inspects in the next round (for both low 
and high discretion treatments). Details are available from the authors on request.  
20 
 
higher in both PLow_Discretion and RLow_Discretion and efficiency increases to 73% in PLow_Discretion and 75% in 
RLow_Discretion. Although efficiency is slightly higher in RLow_Discretion than PLow_Discretion the difference in 
combined earnings is not statistically significant.14 Relative to Baseline, employers’ earnings are 
significantly higher in PLow_Discretion , while employees’ earnings are lower, although this difference is not 
statistically significant. Thus, the ability to punish is mostly beneficial to employers, who on average reap 
about 59% of combined earnings. In contrast, the efficiency gains from rewards are shared by employers 
and employees (52% of combined earnings accrue to employers and 48% to employees). Relative to 
Baseline both employers’ and employees’ earnings increase significantly in RLow_Discretion. 
Table 6: Individual earnings and efficiency 
 Baseline 
(n = 17) 
PLow_Discretion 
(n = 18) 
RLow_Discretion 
(n = 18)  
PHigh_Discretion 
(n = 18)  
RHigh_Discretion 
(n = 18)  
Employer’s Earnings 
22.82 
[53%] 
(7.66) 
27.97 
[59%] 
(6.93) 
25.30 
[52%] 
(4.22) 
27.08 
[58%] 
(4.25) 
33.03 
[53%] 
(7.00) 
Employee’s Earnings 
20.09 
[47%] 
(2.42) 
19.54 
[41%] 
(2.06) 
23.37 
[48%] 
(3.49) 
19.74 
[42%] 
(3.15) 
29.48 
[47%] 
(5.69) 
Combined Earnings 42.91 (8.64) 
47.51 
(7.69) 
48.67 
(7.20) 
46.82 
(5.53) 
62.51 
(12.33) 
Efficiency 66% 73% 75% 72% 83% 
 Baseline PLow_Discretion RLow_Discretion PHigh_Discretion RHigh_Discretion 
Baseline - - - - - 
PLow_Discretion * / ** / n.s. - - - - 
RLow_Discretion ** / * / *** n.s. / n.s. / *** - - - 
PHigh_Discretion * / ** / n.s. n.s. / n.s. / n.s. - - - 
RHigh_Discretion *** / *** / *** - *** / *** / *** *** / ** / *** - 
Notes: “Combined Earnings” are the sum of employer and employee earnings. “Efficiency” is combined 
earnings as a percentage of maximum possible earnings. (In all treatments maximum possible earnings are 65, 
except RHigh_Discretion where maximum possible earnings are 75). Percentage of combined earnings accrued to the 
employer and the employee in square brackets. Standard deviations based on group averages in parentheses. The 
lower part of the table reports significance levels of pairwise two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. In each cell 
the first entry refers to tests applied to combined earnings, the second entry to tests applied to employers’ 
earnings, and the third entry to tests applied to employees’ earnings. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10; n.s. p 
≥ 0.10. 
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 Of course, each time a reward token is assigned in RLow_Discretion combined earnings increase by 2 points so it is 
perhaps not surprising that combined earnings and efficiency are higher in RLow_Discretion (however, note that given our 
parameterization of the game in all treatments combined earnings are maximized when the employee works and the 
employer does not inspect). We also calculated combined earnings net of the costs and benefits of 
reward/punishment tokens. In this case combined earnings are still significantly higher in the incentive treatments 
than Baseline, and the difference between combined earnings in RLow_Discretion and PLow_Discretion is still insignificant.  
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Analogous patterns emerge in the high discretion treatments. Relative to Baseline, combined 
earnings are significantly higher both in PHigh_Discretion and especially in RHigh_Discretion.. This corresponds to 
efficiencies of 72% and 83%, respectively. The difference in efficiency between high discretion 
punishments and rewards is statistically significant.15 Employers' earnings are significantly higher in 
PHigh_Discretion than in Baseline. Employees are slightly worse off in PHigh_Discretion, but the effect is again not 
significant. Thus, the availability of punishments is mostly beneficial to employers, who reap about 58% 
of combined earnings. In contrast, the availability of rewards allows a more equitable distribution of 
earnings across players (with employers obtaining 53% and employees 47% of combined earnings). Both 
employers' and employees' earnings increase significantly in RHigh_Discretion relative to Baseline.  
 In summary, both rewards and punishments significantly enhance efficiency. The effects of both 
instruments are similar in magnitude for the low discretion case, whereas rewards are more efficient than 
punishments under high discretion. Under both low and high discretion, the main recipient of efficiency 
gains is the employer when punishments are available, whereas efficiency gains are shared more equitably 
when rewards are available.   
5. A FURTHER TREATMENT: COMBINING REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS 
The previous results raise an obvious question as to what would follow from the availability of both 
rewards and punishment, since both instruments are available to employers in many naturally occurring 
settings. In this Section we report two additional treatments that examine this question. In these treatments 
employers could follow up an inspection with “No Action”, “Punish”, or “Reward”, and, if “Punish” or 
“Reward” were chosen the employer could assign punishment or reward tokens. We ran a treatment with 
low discretion (R&PLow_Discretion) and a treatment with high discretion (R&PHigh_Discretion). Apart from the 
expanded set of options available to employers, the sessions were conducted in the same way as those of 
the initial study. In all we recruited 72 subjects and ran three sessions of each treatment with twelve 
subjects per session. These sessions took about 40 minutes on average and earnings ranged between £7.10 
and £23.30, averaging £14.89. 
As in the previous treatments, the availability of low discretion incentives reduces shirking: the 
rate of shirking in R&PLow_Discretion (31%) is similar to those in RLow_Discretion and PLow_Discretion (29%), and is 
significantly lower than in Baseline (31% vs. 46%, p = 0.049). An important result from our previous low 
discretion treatments is that the reduction of shirking is achieved with a lower inspection rate when the 
punishment tool is available than when rewards are available. When both punishments and rewards are 
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 We obtain the same results if we focus on combined earnings net of the costs and benefits of reward/punishment 
tokens. 
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simultaneously available the frequency of inspections is 66%, higher than when only punishments are 
available (PLow_Discretion, 56%), but lower than when only rewards are available (RLow_Discretion, 76%). These 
differences in inspection rates between R&PLow_Discretion and the other treatments are not statistically 
significant (p ≥ 0.199).  
The effectiveness of the instruments increases under high discretion. Shirking in the 
R&PHigh_Discretion treatment is reduced to 11%, similar to the rate in RHigh_Discretion (15%, p = 0.506), and 
much lower than those in Baseline (46%, p = 0.000), PHigh_Discretion (29%, p = 0.000), and R&PLow_Discretion 
(31%, p = 0.002). The inspection rate in R&PHigh_Discretion is 20%, also similar to that in RHigh_Discretion (32%, 
p = 0.335) and much lower than in any of the other treatments (56% or higher, p < 0.001 in all 
comparisons).  
We emphasize three main findings from the R&P treatments. First, employers use the reward 
instrument more often than the punishment instrument in the R&P treatments. In R&PLow_Discretion, 
employers use rewards following an inspection in 49% of games, whereas they punish in 20% of games. 
In R&PHigh_Discretion, rewards are used in 71% of games, and punishments are only used in 5% of games.16 
Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that, as we have seen earlier, the outcomes in the R&P are more similar 
to those in the R than the P treatments.17 
Second, employees are not disciplined more effectively when employers can combine 
punishments and rewards, compared to the case where only rewards are available. In fact, although the 
simultaneous availability of punishments and rewards leads to higher combined earnings both in 
R&PLow_Discretion (47.15 points) and in R&PHigh_Discretion (64.68 points) compared to Baseline (42.91 points, p 
= 0.069 and p = 0.000, respectively), combined earnings in these two treatments are not significantly 
different from RLow_Discretion (48.67, p = 0.429) or RHigher_Discretion (62.51, p = 0.589).18 
Finally, the efficiency gains from combining punishment and reward instruments are shared by 
the employer and employee. Compared to Baseline, where employees earn on average 20.09 points per 
                                          
16
 The use and effectiveness of punishment and rewards in the R&P treatments is similar to that in the other incentive 
treatments. Rewards are mainly assigned to employees who are found working and punishments to employees 
caught shirking. The active use of punishment is not a very effective way to discourage shirking, whereas the reward 
instrument is more effective. Details are reported in Appendix B.  
17
 An interesting question is whether there are differences in the use of the two instruments by each employer, and 
whether these differences are stable across rounds. In the experiment we see that most employers predominantly use 
rewards. With low discretion, 12 employers reward more often than they punish, while only 5 employers punish 
more often than they reward. One employer uses each instrument equally often. The results are even stronger when 
discretion is high. Here, 15 employers use rewards more often, while 1 employer uses punishments more frequently 
and 2 employers use both instruments at the same rate. In both treatments, employers' preferences for an instrument 
are remarkably stable. Only one employer in the low discretion treatment switched from mainly using rewards in the 
first half of the experiment to mainly using punishment in the second half of the experiment. 
18
 Combined earnings in R&PLow_Discretion are not significantly different from PLow_Discretion (p = 0.912), whereas 
combined earnings in R&PHigh_Discretion are significantly higher than in PHigh_Discretion (p = 0.000). 
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game, employees’ earnings increase by about 10% in R&PLow_Discretion (to 22.12 points, p = 0.021) and by 
about 45% in R&PHigh_Discretion (to 29.20 points, p = 0.000). Similarly, employers' earnings increase from 
22.82 in Baseline by about 10% in R&PLow_Discretion (albeit insignificantly so; 25.03 points, p = 0.121), and 
by about 55% in R&PHigh_Discretion (to 35.47 points, p = 0.000). This is different from the P treatments 
where efficiency gains accrue only to the employer, and more closely resembles the pattern in the R 
treatments.  
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
It is interesting to relate our main findings to the extant literatures in experimental economics and 
management science. Several related literatures have studied the effectiveness of sanctions and rewards as 
incentive schemes (e.g., Andreoni et al., 2003; Brandts and Charness, 2003, Charness et al., 2008; 
Nikiforakis and Mitchell, 2014), though in different settings and under different conditions than those 
studied here. One related literature focuses on social dilemma settings (e.g., Gürerk et al., 2006; Sefton et 
al., 2007; Rand et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010; Drouvelis and Jamison, forthcoming). There are several 
differences between the typical setup studied in this literature and our inspection game. A key difference 
between the settings is that in the inspection game players are asymmetric in terms of their ability to 
assign or receive punishments or rewards, whereas in the typical social dilemma situation players can 
mutually punish/reward each other.19 Thus, our setup seems better suited to study the effectiveness of 
positive and negative incentives in hierarchical interactions.  
In this sense, our study is also related to the literature on the use of bonuses and fines in principal-
agent games (e.g., Fehr et al., 2007; Fehr and Schmidt, 2007) or on the effect of punishment in gift-
exchange or trust games (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). However, the focus of this literature is on the 
comparison between automatic (enforceable) incentives and discretionary incentives that cannot be 
enforced by a third party. In contrast, in this paper we focus on two different forms of discretionary 
incentives (rewards and sanctions) and compare their effectiveness in disciplining shirking.20  
                                          
19
 Exceptions are Gürerk et al. (2009), Heijden van der et al. (2009), O’Gorman et al. (2009), Carpenter et al. (2012) 
and Nosenzo and Sefton (2014) who study settings where the ability to punish/reward group members is restricted to 
one player. 
20
 There are also related studies that compare economically equivalent contracts that are framed either as bonuses or 
fines (e.g., Hannan et al., 2005; Hossain and List, 2012; Bigoni et al., 2014; Armantier and Boly, forthcoming). In 
contrast to these studies, in our setting the difference between reward and sanctions is not simply a matter of 
framing, and the two instruments provide different incentives to the players.   
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Most closely related is the study by Nosenzo et al. (2014), who also examine the effectiveness of 
sanctions and rewards in inspection games.21 They focus on automatic punishments and rewards that are 
pure monetary transfers in one-shot inspection games. As in the present study they find that punishments 
discourage shirking, reduce inspection rates, and lead to higher efficiencies, but differently from the 
present study, they find that rewards are ineffective in reducing shirking or raising efficiency.  
Thus the disciplining power of punishment is robust across the two contexts whereas the 
effectiveness of rewards seems to be more sensitive to details of the environment. A theoretical analysis 
of how rewards and punishment affect behavior can be used to reconcile these findings. In Nosenzo et al 
(2014) the fact that punishment is more effective than reward for discouraging shirking is consistent with 
the equilibrium predictions of their one-shot game. In our setup the subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
stage game is unaffected by the possibility of using discretionary rewards or punishments because they are 
costly and so should not be used by a profit-maximizing employer. Nevertheless, either punishments or 
rewards can discourage shirking in a repeated game. Thus, as also noted by Rand et al. (2009) in a public 
goods context, rewards may be more effective in repeated game environments. An interesting avenue for 
further research would be to examine more systematically the factors required to facilitate the 
effectiveness of positive incentives.  
A further difference of our study from Nosenzo et al (2014) is that we also study additional 
treatments where we allow employers to use both sanctions and rewards. Somewhat differently from some 
of the previous studies that also examined the joint availability of sanctions and rewards (e.g. Sefton et al., 
2007; Andreoni et al., 2003), we do not find that combining the instruments enhances efficiency relative 
to settings where only rewards are available. This finding is in line with findings from the principal-agent 
literature (Fehr and Schmidt, 2007), where contracts combining bonuses and penalties do not induce 
significantly more effort than contracts that only specify bonuses.  
Taken together, the findings from our paper and the related experimental literatures suggest that 
both discretionary sanctions and rewards can be effective in encouraging compliance and influencing 
behavior in the direction of more socially efficient outcomes. The power of sanctions relies on the threat 
of punishment rather than on its use, whereas the effectiveness of rewards requires the incentive tool to be 
actively used. An implication of this is that the use of rewards results in a re-distribution of wealth 
between authorities and subordinates, whereas sanctions can be used by authorities to reap most of the 
benefits generated by the incentive tool. 
                                          
21
 As far as we are aware there have only been two other experimental studies of inspection games. Glimcher et al. 
(2005) discuss inspection games with different parameterizations of the inspection cost, while Rauhut (2009) studies 
the impact of the severity of automatic sanctions. Neither study compares sanctions with rewards. 
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Our paper also confirms some findings in the management science literature and adds some novel 
insights. In management science, for some decades there has been a focus on how “transformational” 
leadership can improve the performance in firms (Podsakoff et al., 2010). This literature stresses the 
importance of charismatic and visionary leaders. Recent research recognizes the importance of 
“transactional” leadership, according to which managers can use contingent rewards and punishments to 
substantially improve employee attitudes, perceptions and job performance (Ball et al., 1994; Podsakoff et 
al., 2006; Walumbwa et al., 2008). 
In agreement with our findings, the management science literature suggests a positive role for 
contingent rewards on subsequent job performance while the role of contingent punishment is more 
ambiguous. Several studies report that supervisors using rewards are more successful in encouraging 
subordinates to work hard than supervisors who use sanctions (e.g., Sims, 1980; Podsakoff et al., 1982; 
George, 1995). In a review, Podsakoff et al. (2006) report a positive relation between contingent 
punishment and employee attitudes and perceptions, but not between this form of leadership behavior and 
employee performance. Ball et al. (1994) suggest that the effectiveness of contingent punishment depends 
on the perceived fairness of the punishment and the type of employee to whom the punishment is meted 
out. Employees with a “belief in a just world” respond in the intended way and improve their behavior if 
the punishment is considered appropriate. Some employees are predisposed to interpreting punishment in 
negative terms, though, and for them punishment may prove counterproductive. Our results agree with 
this conclusion; we find that the actual use of punishments hardly reduces shirking while the actual use of 
rewards has a dissuasive effect on shirking. We think it is encouraging that conclusions based on 
correlational data of the relevant actors in the field are by and large supported by experimental data that 
allow for causal inferences. 
Our paper also adds new insight to the management science literature. We find that the 
effectiveness of sanctions appears to be less sensitive to the details of the social and economic 
environment, whereas rewards can be more effective in some environments than others. In particular, 
rewards become a very attractive tool if the manager has a lot of discretionary power and can choose to 
reward without inspecting a worker. This implies that the relative effectiveness of rewards and 
punishments depends on the extent to which the managers have to justify their behavior.  
The management science literature suggests some promising avenues for further experimental 
research. In particular, in our paper it is relatively straightforward to judge whether a reward or 
punishment is fair because an employee only chooses between working and shirking. In practice, it will 
often be much harder to judge employee behavior, and therefore there will be more room for self-serving 
distortions of what constitutes a fair reward or punishment. It will be interesting to study the extent to 
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which the current findings will generalize when more uncertainty about worker performance is introduced. 
In addition, on the basis of a questionnaire in the laboratory and a survey in the field, O’Reillys and Puffer 
(1989) point to the social role that contingent punishments may play in organizations. Their results 
suggest that contingent punishments positively affect the motivation and satisfaction of team members 
who observe the punishment being administered to the misbehaving worker. It would be interesting to 
study if such equity feelings translate to an improvement in the behavior of the observing team members. 
They may perform better if they feel that misbehaving workers are punished.
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